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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the optimal management of a joint own-
ership ﬂshery exploitation model where agents use diﬁerent ﬂshing
gears. As opposed to other works, we consider a model in which the
ﬂshing technology aﬁects resource’s growth not only through the har-
vest function, but also through the natural growth rate of the resource.
The main objective is to capture the evidence that some ﬂshing gears
alter the habitat of the resource, and may alter the natural growth
rate of the resource.
The main result we obtain is that, when the natural growth of
the resource is altered by the ﬂshing technology, the optimal stock
is not independent of how harvest quotas are distributed among the
agents. Thus, in this context, a ﬂshing policy that determines, ﬂrst,
the optimum stock and, secondly, decides on how to distribute the
harvest among the diﬁerent agents will not be e–cient.
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11 Introduction
There is considerable world-wide concern about the negative eﬁects that the
exploitation of ﬂshing resources is having on the equilibrium of the marine
ecosystem. And even though it is not easy to quantify the eﬁect, it certainly
does depend, among other things, on the technology or ﬂshing gear used
to harvest the resource. Thus, for example, some ﬂshing gears alter the
habitat of the resource by changing the quantity of the existing foodstuﬁ, or
even by modifying the composition according to types and sizes of natural
communities or by altering the recruitment rate of the resource (Lleonart et
al. 1996). In this case, it can be asserted that the ﬂshing technology employed
can aﬁect the natural growth rate of the resource. In fact, there is a tendency
to diﬁerentiate between ﬂshing gears as a function of their selectivity, that is,
according to their capacity to in￿uence negatively the natural growth of the
resource in terms of a reduction of its recruitment rate. Some of the current
con￿icts in relation with ﬂshing resources are due precisely to the existence
of several agents, who use diﬁerent ﬂshing gears and compete for the same
resource1.
However, a common practice in the economic literature on ﬂshing
resources has been to assume that the ﬂshing activity aﬁects the net growth
of the resource solely through the harvest rate, whereas the natural growth
rate is a function of the resource’s own biomass and of the environmental
conditions of the sea. These conditions are usually assumed stable and
constant. Some recent research holds that joint exploitation when using
diﬁerent technology aﬁects the harvest function (Garza Gil 1998, Guti¶ errez
and Da Rocha 1998) but not the natural growth function. On the other
hand, some papers where ﬂshing technology’s selectivity has been taken into
1The \tuna war" between the Basque and French ￿eet in the Gulf of Biscay, is just an
example. The Basque ￿eet uses gears such as boulters, \curricanes" or live fodder, which
are much more selective than the large driftnets used by the French ￿eet.
2account, only consider the bycatch generated in a multispeciﬂc ﬂshery (Boyce
1996, Turner 1997, Ward 1994).
In this paper we analyze the optimal management of a ﬂshing resource
, taking into account that the natural growth function depends on the
ﬂshing technology employed. Concretely, we include in the growth function a
variable that depends on the selectivity level of the technology and this aﬁects
the intrinsic growth rate of the resource2. We assume that the resource is
exploited by two agents or countries that use diﬁerent technologies, thus,
the natural growth function depends not only on the selectivity level of the
technology used by each agent, but also on the harvest share they obtain.
The principal aim of the paper is to analyze how the optimal stock of
the resource depends on the way in which the ﬂshing quotas are distributed
among the countries. In order to do this, ﬂrstly, we have compute the optimal
stock and harvest rate assuming that the ﬂshing quotas are determined
exogenously; secondly, we have obtained the optimal stock and harvest shares
that maximize the discounted net ￿ow of the ﬂshery.
The former case re￿ects how the Common Fishing Policy of the European
Community (CFP) operates; it is based on the assignment of a ﬂxed
percentage (quota) of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) to each State
Member. The TACs are determined annually for each specie whereas
the shares each country has in these TACs have remained ﬂxed for years
according to the Relative Stability Principle. The main result we obtain is
that, when quotas are given, the optimum stock is not independent of how
the harvest is shared amongst the agents if these agents use ﬂshing gears
with diﬁerent selectivity level. Therefore, in these cases the current design
of the CFP is not e–cient since this policy determines the quotas and the
harvest rate (TAC) separately without taking into account that they are not
independent.
The paper is structured in the following way. In section 2 the basic
model is presented and the basic assumptions are explained. In section 3
2The vegetative growth rate of a resource approaches to the intrinsic growth rate when
the population tends to zero.
3the stock and the optimum harvest are calculated when the allocation of the
quotas is determined exogenously. In section 4 the same analysis is carried
out but assuming that the technologies diﬁer in their selectivity level and
generate diﬁerent unit harvest costs. Section 5 determines the optimum
stock and quotas simultaneously. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main
results obtained.
2 The basic model
We consider a joint ownership ﬂshery exploitation model. To simplify, we
assume that only two countries (or agents) exploit the resource. We denote
Country 1 and Country 2’s harvest shares as ﬁ =
h1(t)
h(t) and (1 ¡ ﬁ) =
h2(t)
h(t) ,
respectively, where h(t) is the total harvest rate.
It is common to assume that the natural growth function of the resource
takes the form F(x) = rx(1 ¡ x
K)3, where k;r and x stand for the carrying
capacity or maximum biomass size, the intrinsic growth rate and resource’s
stock or biomass, respectively. Our aim is to introduce in this function the
eﬁect that the diﬁerent ﬂshing technologies have on the natural growth of
the resource. Firstly, we deﬂne ￿i ‚ 1 as a parameter that measures the
selectivity level of the technology used by country i: If country i uses a
technology which doesn’t aﬁect the natural growth of the resource (a very
selective technology), ￿i takes the unit value. But if country i0s technology
aﬁects, in a negative way, the natural growth of the resource (non selective
technology), ￿i will be greater than unity. Secondly, we take into account
that the eﬁect of the ﬂshing technology on the growth of the resource also
depends on the percentage of harvest caught with that technology. In order
to introduce these two eﬁects in the growth function, we deﬂne a variable, ￿,
which depends on the selectivity level of the ﬂshing technology used by each
country and on the harvest shares in the following way
￿(￿1;￿2;ﬁ) = 1 ¡ ﬁ￿1 ¡ (1 ¡ ﬁ)￿2; ￿ • 0:
3This is the logistic function, ﬂrst proposed by P.F.Verlhust in 1838.
4Finally, we deﬂne e r = r+ ￿ as the observed growth rate of the resource.
Taking into account the previous deﬂnitions, the equation that describes
the natural growth of the resource in our model can be written as







It must be noted that as long as ￿ • 04, the observed growth rate of the
resource (e r) will always be lower than or equal to the intrinsic growth rate
(r); in such a way that G(x;￿) • F(x); 8x. Should be noted that parameter
￿ appears in the natural growth function of the resource in order to re￿ect
that this growth depends on the harvest technology.
The net growth of the resource or population dynamics will be described
by the following equation
dx
dt
= G(x;￿) ¡ h(t): (2)
The harvest function for each country is assumed to be linear in the rate
of its ﬂshing eﬁort (Li(t))5 and in the stock x(t); so that
hi(t) = qLi(t)x(t) i = 1;2; (3)
where q is the catchability coe–cient, which is supposed to be constant and
equal for both countries.
We shall also assume that both countries face a world demand for the
harvested ﬂsh which is inﬂnitely elastic, and that the eﬁort input supply
functions are also inﬂnitely elastic. We denote the unit cost of ﬂshing eﬁort
by a and the price of ﬂsh by p. Country i0s total cost of ﬂshing eﬁort is equal
to aLi(t), and, by equation (3), the unit cost of harvesting can be expressed
as
4When ￿1 = ￿2 = 1 the observed growth rate (
»
r) and the intrinsic growth rate (r)
meet, as long as ￿ = 0. But if ￿1 > 1 or ￿2 > 1, ￿ will be negative for all ﬁ ‚ 0 and
»
r will
be lower than r.
5As usual, we suppose that the eﬁort variable is an index that adds all the inputs used





3 Optimum stock when harvest shares are
given
In this section we consider that the harvest shares obtained by each country
(ﬁ and (1 ¡ ﬁ)) are exogenously determined by a supranational authority
and that they are time invariant6.
The objective functional for each country is its discounted net cash ￿ow










¡–t (1 ¡ ﬁ)[p ¡ c(x)]h(t)dt; (6)
where – > 0 is the discount rate.
We are interested in the optimal harvest rate for each country but,
previously, it is necessary to obtain the optimal equilibrium biomass. Let
us suppose that there exists a supranational authority who chooses the stock
that maximizes the sum of the present value of the revenues obtained from





¡–t [p ¡ c(x)]h(t)dt (7)
s:t:
dx
dt = G(x;￿) ¡ h(t);
x(t) ‚ 0;
h(t) 2 [h min;h max];
where vp = vp1 + vp2:
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
6As mentioned in the introduction, this assumption corresponds to the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) applied by the European Union.
6H = e
¡–t [p ¡ c(x)]h(t) + ‚(t)(G(x;￿) ¡ h(t)); (8)
where ‚(t), the costate variable, is the shadow price of the resource discounted
back to t = 0. The ﬂrst order conditions of the problem are
@H
@h
= 0 = e














= G(x;￿) ¡ h(t): (11)
Solving equations (9), (10) and (11), we obtain that the optimal stock in






This condition implicitly determines the optimal equilibrium biomass,
x⁄; and it diﬁers from the usual modiﬂed Golden Rule equation, because the
yield on the marginal rate investment (r.h.s.) depends on parameter ￿, and
therefore the ﬂshing technology and harvest shares of the countries. In fact,
both the resource’s marginal productivity, Gx(x⁄;￿); and the marginal stock
eﬁect,
c0(x)G(x;￿)
[p¡c(x)] , will decrease if the selectivity level of the countries’ ﬂshing
technology decreases or if the harvest quota of the less selective country
increases.
As proven by Munro (1979), we know that when the natural growth
function of the resource does not depend on the diﬁerences between countries,
the stock and the optimal harvest are independent of the distribution of
ﬂshing quotas among the countries. However, equation (12) shows that if
the ﬂshing technology aﬁects the natural growth of the resource, then the
stock as well as the optimal harvest are not independent of the distribution
of harvest among the countries.


































where Z is described by Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) as an \inverse e–ciency
parameter" (it is equal to the open access biomass level) and ‰ is known as
the bionomic growth ratio. Making use of these deﬂnitions, equation (12)






1 ¡ ‰ + Z +
q
(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)2 + 8‰Z
‚
: (14)
This equation shows how the optimal equilibrium biomass depends on
the eﬁect that the ﬂshing technology and harvest shares have on the natural
growth of the resource. Besides, the optimal harvest also depends on the
ﬂshing technology used by the countries, as long as in the steady state
h⁄(t) = G(x⁄;￿).
This implies that the supranational authority, who determines the harvest
shares, should take into account that two diﬁerent distributions may imply a
diﬁerent optimum biomass and, as a consequence, a diﬁerent optimal harvest
rate. The following propositions show how the sharing of quotas aﬁects the
optimal biomass and proﬂts obtained from the ﬂshery.
Proposition 1
If the ﬂshing technology of country 1 is more (less) selective than the
one of country 2, the greater (smaller) the share of country 1 is, the greater
(smaller) the optimal equilibrium biomass will be. That is




8Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2
If the ﬂshing technology of country 1 is more (less) selective than the
one of country 2, the greater (smaller) the share of country 1 is, the greater
(smaller) the proﬂts obtained from the ﬂshery will be. That is




Proof: See the Appendix.
These propositions show that the equilibrium biomass and the proﬂts
obtained by the society from the ﬂshery will be higher when there is a rise
in the quota of the country with the most selective technology. On the other
hand, it becomes obvious that the optimal biomass doesn’t depend on the
quota sharing when both countries are identical (￿1 = ￿2):
We shall next use a numerical example to illustrate these results. Let
us suppose a ﬂshery where r = 1:2, K = 1:500:000 tones, q = 0:0000025;
– = 0:1;a = 400:000 ptas./ﬂshing days and p = 200:000 ptas./Ton. Besides,
it is assumed that the ﬂshing technology of country 1 is very selective, ￿1 = 1:
First, we consider that both countries receive an egalitarian share (ﬁ = 0:5)
in order to calculate how the changes in the ﬂshing technology of country
2 (from ￿2 = 1 to ￿2 > 1) aﬁect the optimal biomass, optimal harvest and
revenues from the ﬂshery. Table 1 shows that for ￿1 < ￿2; the egalitarian
distribution implies that the optimal biomass and harvest and total beneﬂts
in the steady state decrease as long as the negative eﬁect of the ﬂshing gear
of country 2 increases. If this negative eﬁect is strong enough, it may cancel
the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and reduce its productivity to zero,
thus, the optimal solution would be to lead the resource to its extinction.
(Insert Table 1)
9We now assume that ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = 1:15 and allow the harvest shares
to vary. In Table 2 we show how changes in the harvest shares aﬁect the
optimal biomass, the optimal total harvest and the observed growth rate (e r).
(Insert table 2)
It can be observed that if the quota of the most selective country
decreases, the observed growth rate falls, and this implies a reduction of
optimum biomass and total harvest.
In this section, we have analyzed how optimal biomass depends on the
sharing of the quota among countries, but assuming that the selectivity of the
ﬂshing technology only aﬁects the natural growth function. In the following
section, we take into account that the unit eﬁort cost also depends on the
selectivity level of the ﬂshing gear.
4 Optimum stock when quotas sharing is
given and harvesting costs diﬁer between
countries
It seems natural to think that diﬁerences in the selectivity level of ﬂshing
gears will generate diﬁerent unit eﬁort costs. In this paper we assume that
diﬁerences in the harvesting cost are due to diﬁerences in the unit cost of the




i = 1;2; (15)
where ai is country i0s unit price of ﬂshing eﬁort and q is the catchability
coe–cient.
7Fishing gears that diﬁer in their selectivity level may also imply a diﬁerent catchability
coe–cient or may require diﬁerent intensity of inputs, capital and labor. These are some
of the reasons that may explain the diﬁerences in unit harvesting costs.
10As in the previous section, we assume that the quota sharing is given so






¡–t [ﬁ[p ¡ c1(x)] + (1 ¡ ﬁ)[p ¡ c2(x)]]h(t)dt (16)
subject to the same restrictions of problem (7) in the previous section. From
the ﬂrst order conditions, we obtain the following equation which implicitly




1 (x⁄) + (1 ¡ ﬁ)c0
2 (x⁄)]G(x⁄;￿)
[p ¡ (ﬁc1 (x⁄) + (1 ¡ ﬁ)c2 (x⁄))]
: (17)






1 ¡ ‰ + Z
0 +
q





pqK and ‰ = –
(r+￿).
Once again, we reach the result that the optimal stock depends on
how optimal harvests are shared between both countries although now the
\inverse e–cient parameter" (Z0) also depends on the quota sharing as long
as the unit cost harvesting diﬁers between countries. Equation (18) shows
that the share of optimal harvest aﬁects the optimal biomass, x⁄; through
‰ and through Z0; in such a way that now the eﬁect of quota sharing on
the optimal stock will depend on what the diﬁerences between the countries
are with respect to the selectivity of their ﬂshing technology and their unit

















T 0 , a1 T a2;
the sign of dx⁄
dﬁ may be positive or negative depending on whether ￿1 Q ￿2
and a1 T a2. In order to determine the sign of dx⁄
dﬁ ; we have to consider the
following diﬁerent cases:







(1) ￿1 > ￿2; a1 > a2 + + ?
(2) ￿1 > ￿2; a1 < a2 + ¡ ¡
(3) ￿1 < ￿2; a1 > a2 ¡ + +
(4) ￿1 < ￿2; a1 < a2 ¡ ¡ ?
In cases (1) and (4), the diﬁerences between the countries are such that
assigning a higher quota harvest to country 1 may have a positive or a
negative eﬁect on the optimal biomass, whereas in cases (2) and (3) the
optimal biomass increases if country 1 receives a higher quota harvest8.
In the ﬂrst case, if the harvest quota of country 1 increases, the optimal
biomass may increase or decrease because two opposite eﬁects arise9. On
the one hand, country 1 has the less selective technology (￿1 > ￿2), and
an increase in his quota (ﬁ) implies a reduction of the growing rate of
the resource, and, as a result, the equilibrium biomass tends to be lower.
On the other hand, country 1 has the highest harvesting cost (a1 > a2)
and an increase in his quota implies a higher \inverse e–cient parameter"
(dZ0
dﬁ > 0 , a1 > a2) and optimal biomass tends to be higher (dx⁄
dZ0 > 0).
Therefore, the ﬂnal eﬁect of an increase in the harvest quota of country 1
will depend on the degree of the diﬁerences between the selectivity of the
ﬂshing gear and the harvesting unit cost. In table 3, this ambiguous eﬁect is
shown.
8When both countries use a technology with the same degree of selectivity (￿1 = ￿2)
and they have diﬁerent unit harvesting costs (a1 6= a2); the optimal biomass will be higher
if the percentage of the country with the highest unit cost increases.
9The fourth case is similar to the ﬂrst case as two opposite eﬁects arise again when the
quota share of country 1 increases.
12(Insert table 3)
It can be observed that given a certain diﬁerence in the selectivity of
the ﬂshing technology, optimal biomass may increase or decrease with the
harvest quota of country 1 depending on how great the diﬁerences in unit
harvesting costs between the countries are.
In the second case, if country 1 receives a higher quota harvest the optimal
biomass will decrease. On the one hand, as in the ﬂrst case, country 1 has the
less selective technology (￿1 > ￿2) and an increase in his quota (ﬁ) implies a
reduction of the optimal biomass. But on the other hand, country 1 has now
the lowest harvesting cost (a1 < a2), and an increase in his quota implies a
lower \inverse e–cient parameter" (dZ0
dﬁ < 0 , a1 < a2), in such a way that
the optimal biomass tends to be lower (dx⁄
dZ0 > 0). Therefore, the ﬂnal eﬁect
of an increase in the harvest quota of country 1 is a reduction of the optimal
biomass10.
Since optimal biomass is not independent of how optimal harvest is shared
among countries, the planner should simultaneously determine optimal
quotas and optimal biomass. This problem will be looked into the following
section.
5 Joint determination of optimal biomass
and harvest quotas
The results obtained in the previous section show that given the assumptions
of our model, the optimal stock is not independent of how the harvest quotas
are shared out. The aim of this section is to analyze the joint determination
of the optimal stock and the ﬂshing quotas. We assume that these quotas
must be strictly positive for both countries as we want to consider a situation
in which there is not possibility of restricting the access of a country to the
10Following a similar reasoning, it can be explained why in the third case optimal
biomass increases as country 1’s harvest quota increases.
13resource11.
The social planner’s aim is to maximize the discounted net cash ￿ow from
the ﬂshery, subject to the same restrictions as in the previous section. The
share is not now given and, therefore, we will have two control variables rather
than one. For simplicity, we consider each country’s harvest as the control
variables, h1(t) and h2(t)12, in such a way that the objective functional can





¡–t [(p ¡ c1(x))h1(t) + (p ¡ c2(x))h2(t)]dt: (19)
The Hamiltonian of this problem can be written as
H = e
¡–t [[p ¡ c1 (x)]h1(t) + [p ¡ c2(x)]h2(t)]+‚(t)(G(x;￿) ¡ h1(t) ¡ h2(t))
(20)
and the ﬂrst order conditions are
@H
@hi
= 0 = e









1 (x)h1(t) + c
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= G(x;￿) ¡ h1(t) ¡ h2(t): (23)
As equation (21) shows, we must now take into account the eﬁect of
the harvest rate of each country on the natural growth of the resource. This
eﬁect is measured by the term Ghi(x;￿), which is the derivative of the natural
growth function (1) with respect to the harvest rate of each country and is
equal to
11If we allow that the whole quota go to just one country, the other should be
compensated in a proper way. This could be done by side payoﬁs, but these are not
always wellcome by countries because of socioeconomic aspects linked with the population
involved in ﬂshing activities.
12The same result will be obtained if we consider the total harvest rate, h(t); and the










(￿j ¡ ￿i): (24)
As can be observed, the eﬁect that the harvest of each country has on the
natural growth of the resource will be diﬁerent depending on the selectivity
degree of the technology of each country and on how the harvest is shared
between both of them. Besides, if ￿i 6= ￿j, this term will always be positive
for one country and negative for the other.
If we solve the ﬂrst order conditions (21), (22) and (23) (h(t) = G(x⁄;￿)),













p ¡ ci (x⁄)
: i;j = 1;2
(25)
When the social planner computes the optimal stock, he/she equals the
ratio of marginal revenue to the eﬁect that the ﬂshing activity of both
countries has on the natural growth rate. Each possible share of total harvest
implies a diﬁerent eﬁect upon the marginal growth rate, and so, a univocal
determination of the optimal biomass (x⁄) and the harvest shares (h⁄
1 and
h⁄
2) is not possible. However, taking into account that we are interested in an
interior solution in the feasible space with positive quotas for both countries,
we can determine some necessary conditions that ought to be satisﬂed.
Solving the ﬂrst order condition (21) for i = 1;2, we have that
[p ¡ c1 (x)]
1 ¡ Gh1(x;￿)
=
[p ¡ c2 (x)]
1 ¡ Gh2(x;￿)
: (26)
Condition (26) states that the optimal control requires that the ratio between
marginal revenues and the harvest eﬁect of each country on the natural
growth rate should be equal for both countries. As long as Ghi(x;￿) and
Ghj(x;￿) always have opposite sign, it is necessary to guarantee that both
be, in absolute value, lesser than one, in order to satisfy equation (26).
Lemma 1
15For the existence of a steady state in the interior of the feasible
control space, a necessary condition is that Ghi(x;￿) 2j (0;1) j





» r 8 ￿i > ￿j: (27)
Proof: See the Appendix.
If ￿i > ￿j, then we have that (￿i ¡ ￿j)
h⁄
i
h⁄ > 0 and therefore
» r> 0: In
other words, this lemma states that the negative eﬁect of the selectivity of
the ﬂshing gear on the natural growth rate cannot be so high as to cancel
the growth of the resource.
Lemma 2
If country 1’s ﬂshing technology is more (less) selective than
country 2’s, i.e., ￿1 < ￿2 (￿1 > ￿2), an interior solution requires
that
a1 > a2 (a1 < a2):
Proof: See the Appendix.
This lemma states that a necessary condition to achieve an optimal
interior solution is that the country with the least selective technology must
have the lowest unit harvesting cost. We can therefore conclude that, when
both countries have identical unit harvesting costs but a diﬁerent selectivity
ﬂshing technology, the optimal solution cannot imply positive quotas for both
countries.
In the previous section we have distinguished four cases with diﬁerent
possible asymmetries between countries, in terms of ai and ￿i. The next table
shows in which of those cases the optimal harvest quota for each country will
be positive.
16Case Diﬁerences between countries Percentage Country 1 Percentage Country 2
(1) ￿1 > ￿2; a1 > a2 0 1
(2) ￿1 > ￿2; a1 < a2 [0;1] [0;1]
(3) ￿1 < ￿2; a1 > a2 [0;1] [0;1]
(4) ￿1 < ￿2; a1 < a2 1 0
As can be seen in this table, an interior solution may be optimal in two of
the cases, that is, when the least selective country has a lower unit harvesting
cost than the other.
We have obtained necessary conditions for an interior solution to the
problem, but they are not su–cient to guarantee that there exist an interior
solution. This can be observed in the following numerical example. Let us use
the ﬂshery example in section 3 to show that the least selective country should
have a certain cost advantage to make a positive quota for both countries
optimal. We take as given the countries’ selectivity ﬂshing technology,
(￿1 = 1; ￿2 = 1:15) and the unit eﬁort cost of country, a1 = 400:000 ptas./
ﬂshing day. Besides, we consider a ﬂxed target biomass13, x⁄ = 1:1305£106,
which is the optimum when the shares are given. Using equation (26) we
compute the optimal harvest quotas for the diﬁerent unit harvesting cost of
country 2.
(Insert table 4)
Table 4 shows the range of the unit eﬁort cost of country 2 for which there
exists a positive share for both countries. For a given diﬁerence between
countries in the selectivity of the ﬂshing technology, we ﬂnd that the quota
of the least selective country rises as long as its unit cost of harvesting goes
13We consider a given biomass which is obtained from Table 2. We should remember
that a univocal determination of harvest shares and optimal biomass is not possible, due
to the existing interaction between them.
17down. Besides, if its cost advantage is high enough, the optimal policy implies
a corner solution where only the least selective country exploits the resource.
We can thus conclude that, when the social planner tries to
simultaneously determine optimal stock and optimal harvest shares, an
interior solution will be optimal only for certain asymmetries between
countries. Besides, the planner would only be able to determine for each
quota sharing its corresponding optimal biomass, or vice versa, solving
conditions (26) and (25) simultaneously.
6 Conclusions
The fact that certain ﬂshing gears or ﬂshing technologies may aﬁect
the resource’s natural growth rate negatively seems fairly straightforward.
However, in the economic literature on ﬂshing resources, it has always been
assumed that the natural growth of a resource is a function of its own biomass
and of the sea’s environmental conditions, and these are considered to be
stable and constant.
In this paper we analyze the optimal management of a ﬂshery where
the natural growth function for the ﬂshing resource depends on the ﬂshing
technology employed. We have included in the growth function a variable
which depends on the selectivity level of the ﬂshing gear and which aﬁects the
resource’s intrinsic growth rate. Concretely, it is supposed that the natural
growth function depends not only on the selectivity level of the technology,
but also on the harvest share obtained with that technology.
First, we determine the optimal stock and harvest under the assumption
that there exists a supranational authority which determines the ﬂshing
quotas exogenously. And this is the way in which the Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP) acts, that is, it assigns to each State Member the right to ﬂsh
a ﬂxed percentage (quota) of the Total Allowable Catches (TAC) which is
determined for each specie annually. The principal result obtained is that
the optimum stock is not independent of how the harvest is shared among
the agents. Therefore, the current CFP cannot be e–cient if the ﬂshing
18technologies of the State Members do not have the same level of selectivity.
In this case, an optimal CFP should determine the stock and the harvest
quotas simultaneously. In this paper, we deal with a ﬂrst analysis of the
implications that this type of policy would entail when both countries, in
addition to using diﬁerent technologies, have diﬁerent unit harvest costs. We
have thus concluded that a solution with positive harvest quotas for both
countries will only be optimal for certain asymmetries between countries.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Lets start by checking that ￿1<￿2 ) dx⁄
dﬁ > 0, where x⁄ is given by equation
(15). Taking into account that ￿1<￿2 ) d￿
dﬁ > 0 and given that d
»
r




r < 0, what we now have to prove is that dx⁄
d‰ < 0: In order to check that
dx⁄
dﬁ < 0 when ￿1<￿2, we have also to prove that dx⁄
d‰ < 0, because in this case
d￿
dﬁ < 0.








(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)(¡1) + 4Z
q
(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)2 + 8‰Z
3
5 < 0; (28)
and this implies that
(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)(¡1) + 4Z <
q
(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)2 + 8Z‰:
Having made some operations the previous condition entails that
8Z(Z ¡ 1) < 0;
in such a way that dx⁄
d‰ < 0 =) Z < 1. In other words, the \inverse e–cient
parameter" must be lower than one and this condititon is always fulﬂlled.





where x⁄ < K; because lim
t!1 x(t) = K; and c(x⁄) < p: Therefore, if the ﬂshery
is being exploited, then Z < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
In the steady state, proﬂts from the ﬂshery are given by
…
⁄ = [p ¡ c(x
⁄)] h
⁄
20in such a way that
d…⁄
dﬁ














q (x⁄)2 < 0;
dx⁄
dﬁ







) R 0 if ￿1 Q ￿2;
and if we prove that dh⁄
dﬁ R 0 if ￿1 Q ￿2, we will have proven proposition 2.
We know that d
»
r




r < 0 when ￿1 < ￿2. Using the \bionomic growth
rate parameter" presented in the main text and taking into account that in
the steady state h = G(x⁄;￿) =
» r (x⁄ ¡
(x⁄)2

























What we now have to prove is that dh⁄
d‰ is always negative, hence dx⁄
dﬁ
and dh⁄
dﬁ will be possitive or negative depending on ￿1 Q ￿2. Equation (30)










r h⁄ and x‰hx will be negative
and, therefore, dh⁄
d‰ as well. But it is also known (Munro and Clark 1985)
that the optimal biomass in the steady state must be higher than k
2.
To see how in this case dh⁄
d‰ is negative we will formulate the equilibrium
biomass as a proportion of the carrying capacity of the resource x⁄ = A⁄k
























21To prove that dh⁄
d‰ is negative, we have to show that the second term in
brackets of equation (31) is lower than the ﬂrst one equation With this aim,








(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)(¡1) + 4Z
q
(1 ¡ ‰ + Z)2 + 8‰Z
3
5 (32)
Then, from (32) we know that dA⁄
d‰ 2 (¡1
2;0); and since we are considering
an optimal biomass x⁄ > k
2 it is clear that A⁄ 2 (1












And it is easy to show that this condition is always satisﬂed.
Proof of Lemma 1
When ￿i 6= ￿j, Ghi(x;￿) and Ghj(x;￿) have opposite signs, and for the
feasibility of condition (26), these both terms must be, in absolute value,
lesser than the unity.
In the steady state, we have that G(x;￿) = h(t) and replacing this








(￿j ¡ ￿i) < 1 )
hj
h
(￿j ¡ ￿i) <
» r when ￿j > ￿i:
Proof of Lemma 2
From lemma 1 we know that if ￿2 > ￿1; then Gh1(x;￿) 2 (0;1) and
Gh2(x;￿) 2 (¡1;0). Therefore, equation (26) requires that
p ¡ c1 (x) < p ¡ c2 (x);
which implies that a1 > a2; as long as c1 (x) = a1
qx and c2 (x) = a2
qx:
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24Table 1:
Biomass, harvest and proﬂts when ￿1 = 1
￿2 X(£106)(1) h(1) …(2)
1 1.1317 3.3344£105 1.9546£1010
1.15 1.1305 3.1329£105 1.8318£1010
2 1.1194 1.9882£105 1.1346£1010
3 1.0584 6.2319£104 3.0429£109
>3.4 0 - -
(1) Tones; (2) Pesetas
Table 2:
Biomass and harvest for diﬁerent shares
ﬁ X(£106)(1)
» r h (£105)(1) h1 (£105)(1) h2 (£105)(1)
ﬁ = 1 1.1317 1.2000 3.3344 3.3344 0
ﬁ = 0:75 1.1311 1.1712 3.2338 2.4253 0.8084
ﬁ = 0:5 1.1305 1.1250 3.1329 1.1566 1.5664
ﬁ = 0:25 1.2990 1.0875 3.0318 0.7579 2.2738
ﬁ = 0 1.2920 1.0500 2.9310 0 2.9310
(1) Tones
25Table 3:
Optimal stock evolution when ￿1(1:2) > ￿2(1:1) and a1(400:000) > a2
ﬁ X(1)for a2 = 376000 X for a2 = 398231 X for a2 = 399000
0 1:104250 1:128183 1:129010
0:2 1:109044 1:128210 1:128871
0:4 1:113835 1:128222 1:128719
0:6 1:118621 1:128222 1:128554
0:8 1:123404 1:128210 1:128376
1 1:128183 1:128183 1:128183
(1) (£106)
Table 4:
Country’s quota for diﬁerent unit harvesting costs
a1 a2 ﬁ




400:000 • 372:460 0
26